"The TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE" is the prevailing perspective of Jurists concerning Islamic precepts in which Quranic juristic verses and respective hadiths are usually taken into consideration. In this perspective, some parts of the Quran- about 500 to 800 verses – are used in the process of religious understanding of precepts and the remaining, especially Quranic stories, are taken away from the realm of juristic research less attention being paid to them. "The Quran-pivoted, comprehensive JURISPRUDENCE" is a juristic approach to the whole Quran in which all verses concerning beliefs, ethics, stories, etc. are taken into consideration in addition to the juristic verses.      

Islam is a universal and eternal religion due to the perfection of the divine rules which are in fact one of its miracles. In the face of constant needs, changing needs will emerge, and these changes must be protected in order to preserve and maintain its purity and appropriate growth. For the same reason, the dynamics is not a divider of TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, but TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE is dynamic in itself. Ijtihad, which is rightly called the dynamics of Islamic law, means a deliberate and methodical attempt to extract the verdict of God according to the four sources of the Book, Islamic tradition, wisdom and consensus. Providing some criteria and examples, this article attempts to explain who the time and place influence the religious judgments.

Women's rights are one of the important legal fields that are faced with different views in TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, all of which are rooted in foundations and methods. The fundamental question is what are the foundations and practical challenges of rebuilding the TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE approach to women's rights. With a critical analytical approach and focusing on the findings of TRADITIONAL jurists, this article tries to answer the above question and find out in which areas the approach of TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE in the category of women's rights needs re-reading.The findings of this research show that the challenges to the TRADITIONAL approach and its foundations in women's rights are multiplying and increasing, so that it can bring the role of this jurisprudential approach in human life to a crisis, and this involves the need to update and modernize the TRADITIONAL approach to JURISPRUDENCE in order to be present in the public and humanitarian sphere in the surrounding world. In this article, after explaining the concepts, only some of the challenging foundations of the TRADITIONAL approach to women's rights; Just like the human personality, the legal personality and the spiritual personality of the woman have been investigated.

In Islamic society, according to rational and rational evidence, governors and people have equal rights and duties, each of which must fully accomplish its duties and, on the other hand, exercise their rights in the best way. One of the duties of the people towards the governors is to choose the right one and trust them in the assignment of affairs. In contrast to one of the rights of the people in relation to this trust and choice, the right to question and impeach the assigned duties. In recent years, a two-law plan has been introduced in the legislature, which rejected the question of the authorities with the aim of attracting attention and criminalized it. But according to the present study, this plan and any similar plan have contradicted the narrative and rational arguments contained in the Islamic sources. Incidentally, in Islamic teachings, including verses and narrations, and the syllable of Prophet (PBUH) and Alavi (AS) The emphasis has been on the right of this right. Secondly, the denial of the right to ask and demand from public officials and rulers is in conflict with the principle of "freedom of expression" contained in the Constitution; thirdly, with the human rights standards and the principles of democratic societies, such as the principle of freedom of opinion and freedom of the press, and so on, which Iran is also unanimous. The present study, based on the bibliographic and descriptive-analytical sources, examines the right of question and the fundamental rejection of the twofourth plan and its similar plans and bills based on the jurisprudential doctrines and Islamic law.

One of the arguments cited by Imamia jurists in jurisprudential and Usul al-Fiqh books to prove or disprove a verdict is the prohibition of establishing a new JURISPRUDENCE. Despite the relatively high use of this argument among jurists, no definition of establishing a new JURISPRUDENCE has been offered nor has the reason behind its prohibition been presented. What this research seeks to find is the concept of establishing a new JURISPRUDENCE and the reason behind its prohibition. For this purpose, the Imamia jurisprudential and Usul al-Fiqh works and other written documents have been searched and studied using various keywords and after finding examples of jurists' citations, the authors have attempted to discover the concept and the reason behind prohibition of establishing a new JURISPRUDENCE. The result of this research is that establishing a new JURISPRUDENCE has been considered to be the same as having rare opinions and changing the permanent verdicts. The probable bases of this prohibition which is obtained in some way from the opinions of jurists are: the correlation between establishing a new JURISPRUDENCE and opposition to Idjma, contradiction with the necessities of the age of the Infallibles, contradiction with the spirit of worship, contradiction with the standards of Usul-al-Fiqh, contradiction with the requirements of religion and contradiction with rectifying the effective cause. By examining each case, its inability to prove the prohibition of establishing a new JURISPRUDENCE has become obvious. Therefore, it can be said that establishing a new JURISPRUDENCE is not per se prohibited; however, this does not mean that a new JURISPRUDENCE is in contradiction with the TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE. Instead, it means the necessity of applying strong arguments in jurisprudential inferences.

Following the Islamic Revolution and the emphasis on the Islamization of laws, Taʿzīr punishments were officially recognized for the first time in the Islamic Penal Code. The introduction and expansion of Taʿzīr punishments within Iran’s criminal law system has raised important questions regarding their interpretation and developments. Therefore, identifying the influential discourses in the formation of Taʿzīr punishments and the factors contributing to their hegemony (dominance) are key issues in the philosophical understanding of these punishments. The primary objective of this study is to clarify the role and impact of current discourses on the transformations occurring in the field of Taʿzīr punishments, employing the discourse analysis methodFindings reveal that three discourses have influenced the transformations of Taʿzīr punishments: 1) governmental JURISPRUDENCE 2) TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE and 3) penal modernism. In the early stages of the formation of Taʿzīr punishments, the governmental and TRADITIONAL approaches were opposing discourses. During this period, the dominance of governmental JURISPRUDENCE over TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE led to the recognition of the paradigms advocated by supporters of governmental JURISPRUDENCE, such as the determination of Taʿzīr by the ruling authority, the specification of Taʿzīr, and their diversity as fundamental principles of Taʿzīr punishments. However, the findings of empirical research in criminology and penology, on the one hand, and the flexibility of Taʿzīr punishments under the principle “al-ta'zīru bimā yarahu al-ḥākīm” (Taʿzīr is at the discretion of the ruler) on the other hand have contributed to making the discourse of penal modernism also a dominant discourse in the realm of of Taʿzīr punishments.

Based on common definitions, JURISPRUDENCE has been designed to explain and elaborate the rules and their evidences. By evidences we mean the documents that prove that a certain rule is od’ s command and according to expression of the jurists the reason for issuing a rule is not related to the mysteries of rules and the philosophy which is concealed in its issuance. The jurist is not obliged to unveil these secrets, however the increasing expansion of communities, versatility, and plurality of the necessary issues in the society have proven that reliance on the evidences doesn’ t fulfill the needs of the society and one cannot expect that there should be a reason from among the legal evidences for every social necessary issue. Therefore, it will be inevitable to seek help of the reasons of legal evidences to determine the religious task at the time of silence or ambiguity or religious rules and to generalize the existing rules to other cases by means of reason or in the cases when the reason is resolved the rules also have to be resolved and to expand or spoil religious rules. This important issue necessitates that the jurists do not suffice to express the evidences and to take a step toward etiology. The present study aims at explaining the accurate meaning of the reason and the necessity to explore and explain the reasons of rules and consequences of incorrect etiology to prepare the ground for the movement of JURISPRUDENCE from explaining the evidences to explaining the reasons and to provide the fundamentals of establishing the evidential JURISPRUDENCE through identifying the correct methods of reason exploration. By doing this, it can help and improve the evidential JURISPRUDENCE and can prevent from undesirable effects of unprofessional reasoning for rules.

Introduction Simulation, cloning, or deletion is the proliferation of a living creature without sexual intercourse in plants, animals, and humans. The issue of therapeutic simulation as a new phenomenon in the field of biotechnology reveals various questions in different fields and brings up various approaches of Ulama in terms of human-related communication. This reviewed study was conducted by use of a descriptive-analytical method with the aim of the analysis of therapeutic simulations in the Persian JURISPRUDENCE and the Jewish JURISPRUDENCE. Conclusion The Imams’ jurists on therapeutic simulations have adopted three approaches: 1) absolute license; 2) conditional license; 3) Absence of absolute license. Sunni Ulama have adopted two approaches on therapeutic simulations: 1) the license; 2) lack of permission. Jewish jurists have adopted three different views: 1) the license 2) the obligation 3) sanctity. According to the results, the Ulama’ s view about the lack of licensing of therapeutic simulations is due to the serious concerns that are created in the world, and this is due to misuse that may result, abuses that are unlimited in scope and its effects are not clear. This has led to adopting a viewpoint of non-permission of therapeutic simulations. The viewpoint of Ulama based on the license of therapeutic simulations emphasizes the benefits of therapeutic simulations, which is expected to treat of many of diseases that humankind has not been able to cure. But based on the views of most Islamic Ulama, there is no reason to ban the therapeutic simulation of human and should not oppose the advancement of science and research in this field.

In family JURISPRUDENCE, the overarching topic of the family is examined in terms of the social system. The family education system, a branch of this jurisprudential system, encompasses three types of education from this perspective: disciplinary education, behavioral education, and developmental education. Developmental education focuses on the practical measures for development and maturity suitable for social life. In this type of education, the educator prepares the trainee for life outside the parental environment. Objective, This study aims to educationally analyze marriage at the age of growth from the perspective of family JURISPRUDENCE. The paper, using the system discovery method and based on the refinement of general norms, seeks to uncover the threefold responsibilities of family, society, and governance. Its findings indicate that, according to the Holy Quran, there are four categories of narrations and justificatory evidence for intervention. First, the encouragement of a girl's marriage before puberty in narrations is conditioned by the obligation of chastity, and this encouragement has no specific limitation. Second, the implication of a boy's marriage involves accepting responsibility for alimony and other marital and parental duties, which aligns with the obligatory social education by the guardian. Third, marriage before completing the growth period does not entail prohibition or nullity, and the preparatory-guardianship responsibilities of the family and the state eliminate rational obstacles. Consequently The legitimacy of marriage at the age of growth, in line with the threefold educational responsibilities, is proven to prevent potential harm.